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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of trausnational terrorists' have been
apprehended on French soil and have been the subject of extradition
requests from other countries. This article examines the progression of
French jurisprudence on the extradition of transnational terrorists, fo-
cusing upon the issue of whether terrorist acts can be considered legally
as political offenses and hence exempt from extradition. The analysis
of this issue integrates French judicial decisions into the general con-
text of international practice-beginning with an assessment of extradi-
tion procedures and proceeding to a discussion of the special problems
raised by the application of the political offense exception. A survey of
international extradition jurisprudence reveals that the tribunals of var-
ious countries have elaborated a series of tests by which to define the
concept of a political offense.
Three principal tests have been developed and each of them re-
sponds differently to the vexed problem of attributing a precise legal
status to relative political crimes, Ze., to acts which have the character-
istics of a common crime, but which also have political aspects. De-
spite the viability of the Anglo-American and the early French judicial
methodologies, the Swiss approach appears best-suited to deal with this
problem. This approach consists of weighing the two aspects of the act
* The author is a Jervey Fellow at the Parker School, Columbia University, and cur-
rently is at Tulane University.
1. For a definition of the term "transnational terrorism", see Lillich & Paxman, State
Responsibility For Injuries To Allens Occasoned By Terrorist Acti i e, 26 AM. U.L Re.
217, 219 n.l (1977).
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in question in an ad hoc fashion to determine whether its principal
character is political or nonpolitical. It is noteworthy that the method-
ology of the French courts--originally committed to an objective test
and to the notion of purely political crimes-has been altered as the
jurisprudence of the courts developed. In contemporary litigation in-
volving the extradition of alleged political offenders, the French courts
have adopted a test which is similar to the one utilized by their Swiss
counterparts. Since this study focuses upon French jurisprudence, the
current methodology of the French courts relating to the extradition of
transnational terrorists is described in some detail. Finally, the most
recent French judicial decisions on the subject of the extradition of
transnational terrorists are analyzed individually. The reasoning and
the outcome of these cases are assessed in light of efforts to bring legal
sanctions to bear against terrorist offenders despite their claims that
their crimes are politically motivated.
II. EXTRADITION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISM
2
Modem means of transportation and communication as well as
the development of sophisticated networks for clandestine activity be-
tween countries have enabled today's terrorists to pursue their activities
unimpeded by national boundaries. The members of a terrorist group
can be trained and equipped in one country to commit their acts of
violence on the territory of another state. Furthermore, once their mis-
sion is completed, they can escape to yet a third country. 3
Given these circumstances, the process of extradition constitutes
one of the legal means by which to deal with the dilemma of transna-
tional terrorism. By making an extradition request through the appro-
priate channels, a country can obtain an individual who allegedly has
committed or who has been convicted of a crime on its territory and
who has escaped and been apprehended in another country.4 The
2. In this section dealing with extradition practice and transnational terrorism, the
author has relied upon the information contained in a previous study. See Note, The
Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of Abu Daoud by French Authorities, 17 VA. J.
INT'L L. 495, 495-96, 503-04 (1977). The substance of this previous study, however, has been
updated and revised for the purposes of the present article.
3. For example, on December 18, 1973, Arab terrorists attacked a Pan American jet
airliner at the Rome airport. Thirty-two persons were killed during the attack. In order to
escape, the terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa plane and flew to Athens. They then flew to
Kuwait. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 8; id Dec. 20, 1973, at 1, col. 1. For an
analysis of this incident, see Lillich & Paxman, supra note 1, at 277, 304.
4. Extradition has been defined as "the act by which one nation delivers up an individ-
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practice of extradition, then, symbolizes a type of international cooper-
ation aimed at the repression of criminal activity. 5 In French law, for
example, the process of extradition is considered as part of interstate
assistance designed to curb criminality and punish criminal offenders.6
An extradition request also has a diplomatic character;, it calls into play
the legal duties of the national government as they arise under public
international law.7
Under customary international law, however, states are not under
a legal duty to grant the request for extradition of an alleged offender.
A country has the discretion to extradite regardless of the character of
the crime or crimes for which the individual is wanted. Any legal obli-
gation which binds a country in a given extradition matter will flow
from the provisions of bilateral or multilateral treaties to which the
countries involved are parties. In the absence of an applicable extradi-
tion convention, the requested state has the unfettered discretion either
to grant or to refuse the extradition request.8 The prerogative of states
in this area, of course, can become an obstacle to the punishment of
internationally wanted criminals, especially to the punishment of trans-
national terrorists who have fled to a country which is sympathetic to
their cause. Even in cases in which the provisions of a treaty are con-
trolling, there is no absolute guarantee that a requested extradition will
be forthcoming because often the charges for which an extradition re-
quest will be granted are limited to the set of offenses enumerated in
the treaty.9
Moreover, the typical extradition treaty contains a political offense
exception. Under such a provision, the request for the extradition of an
individual cannot be granted when the crime for which he is sought is
considered to be political either in character or in purpose.' 0 The pos-
sible application of this provision in a case involving the extradition of
a transnational terrorist can be a significant impediment to bringing
legal sanctions to bear against fugitive criminal offenders.
ual, accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, to another nation which
demands him, and which is competent to try and punish him." 1 J. B. MOORE, A TREATISE
ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDrTION 3 (1891). See also A. BILLOT, TEArrE DE
L'EXTRADITION 1 (1874); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (4th rcv. ed. 1968).
5. See F. PIGGOTT, EXTRADmON 5-16 (1910).
6. See Aymond, Extradition [I-Droit P6nal] ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ ch. 1. sec. 1,
para. 6 (1968).
7. See id at ch. 1, sec. 1, para. 4, sec.2, para. 34.
8. See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 1, at 300.
9. See id.
10. See id at 300-03.
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Finally, it should be noted that the essence of an extradition deci-
sion pertains to political matters. Extradition is a question to be re-
solved ultimately by the executive arm of the country of the requested
state. The judiciary, of course, takes part in this process, but its role, at
least in theoretical terms, is limited and subordinate. French law is
instructive in this regard.
According to the provisions of the French extradition statute," the
main features of which relate to the allocation of decision-making au-
thority in the process of extradition, the executive branch of the na-
tional government, while under a legal obligation to consult with the
judiciary,I2 has the final word in matters of extradition. 13 The principal
task of the chambre des mises en accusation of the Cour d'appel is to
determine whether the extradition request is in conformity with proce-
dural requirements.' The court does have power in the process in that
it can deny an extradition request on substantive grounds and this de-
nial is binding upon the executive.' 5 But, otherwise, the executive is
free to grant or to deny the request on the basis of its own determina-
tion. '6
The subordinate role of the courts takes on greater significance
when an offender seeks to invoke the political offense exception be-
cause it is for the judiciary to define the concept of political crime and
to determine how it is to be applied in extradition litigation. While
government officials can merely declare that they consider terrorist acts
to be ordinary crimes of a particularly heinous sort regardless of the
political coloration that is attributed to them by their perpetrators, the
task of judicial determination is not quite so simple. A court must look
for plausible reasons for distinguishing common crimes from political
offenses in order to discredit allegations by the terrorists that their acts
have a political character. The court is obligated to devise a set of cri-
teria by which to determine the political character, if any, of terrorist
11. Law of March 10, 1927, [1927] Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franqaise [J.O,1
2874, 1 LA GAZETrE DU PALAIS [GAZ. PALAIS] 1019 (Fr.). For an analysis of the substance
of this law, see Travers, La loifranqaise d'extradition du 10 mars 1927, 54 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL (J. DR. INT'L.) 595 (1927).
12. Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 14-17, [1927] J.0. 2877-79, 1 GAZ. PALAIS 1020, See
also Aymond, supra note 6, at ch. 1, sec. 2, paras. 36, 38, 40.
13. Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 2, 18, [19271 J.0. 2874, 2880, 1 GAZ. PALAIS 1019-20.
14. Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 16-17, [1927] J.0. 2879, 1 GAz. PALAIS 1020, See also
Aymond, supra note 6, at ch. 1, sec. 2, para. 38.
15. Law of March 10, 1927, arts. 16-17, [1927] J.0. 2879, 1 GAZ. PALAIS 1020.
16. Law of March 10, 1927, art. 18, [1927] J.0. 2880, 1 GAz. PALAIS 1020. See also
Aymond, supra note 6, at ch. 1, sec. 2, para. 38.
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acts when evaluating an extradition request.1 7
I. THE FORMULATION OF JUDICIAL TESTS
RELATING TO THE DETERMINATION OF
POLITICAL CRIMES 18
A. The History of the Political Offense Exception to Extraditable
Crimes
The emergence of the political offense exception to extradition is
linked historically to the practice of granting asylum to criminal offend-
ers. The latter practice had its origins in ancient civilizations; t9 for ex-
ample, asylum was very much a part of the Greek legal culture.20
Although the privilege of asylum was afforded to ordinary criminals in
ancient times, it was not extended to political offenders because a polit-
ical infraction was seen as an intolerable offense against the community
and the gods that the community worshipped.2'
The practice of asylum varied from society to society, the Church
being the major force behind the practice until modem times. 2 By the
17th century, however, the protection afforded to common criminals
had come to be perceived as a threat to the stability of international
order and the formal practice of extradition eventually came to replace
that of asylum.' While legal scholars of the 17th century were insensi-
tive to the plight of fugitives from justice, they were keenly aware of the
dangers of political persecution and religious intolerance. As a conse-
quence, in addition to fostering the new concept of extradition, they
also advanced the position that the victims of political persecution and
religious intolerance should be afforded some form of safe haven in
17. Id
18. In this section on the judicial construction of the political offense exception, the
author has relied on the information contained in a previous study. See Carbonneau, The
Political Offense Exception to Extradition and Transnational Terrorist" Old Doctrine
Reformulated and New Norms Created, 1 A.S.LL.S. IN'L L. I (1977). The substance of
this previous study, however, has been updated and revised for the purposes of the present
article.
19. For a detailed discussion of the early origins of asylum, see L KOZIEBRODZXJ, LE
DRorr D'ASILE 30 (1962); 2 J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNA*ONAL LAw § 291 (1906); S.
SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.5-6 (1971); Reale, Le Droit D1sile, 63 HAGUE
RECUEIL DES CouRs 471, 479 (1938).
20. See, eg., Reale, supra note 19, at 499-501.
21. See, ag., id
22. See, e-g., id at 485.
23. See, ag., id at 507-10.
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neighboring foreign states. Accordingly, offenses of a political charac-
ter replaced common crimes as the special exception to extradition.24
By the 18th century, the development of the political offense ex-
ception to extradition was buttressed by the development of a revolu-
tionary political ideology. The status of the political refugee became
privileged; it was deemed unjust to make the moral or legal validity of
a political act dependent upon its success or failure.25 The principle of
the nonextradition of political offenders, however, was still subject to
the discretion and calculations of national governments.
In practice, until about 1850, the extradition of political offenders
took place quite frequently and the principle of their nonextradition
did not become integrated into state practice until extradition treaties
began to formally exempt political offenses from the grounds for extra-
dition.26 Once the principle was accepted, national governments at-
tempted to limit the exception by adopting a narrow definition of the
concept of a political offense.27 By the end of the 19th century, al-
though countries recognized the special legal status of political offend-
ers, there was no international consensus on what was meant by the
term political offense.28 The major difficulty lay in distinguishing rela-
tive political crimes from common crimes, the former consisting of acts
in which there was a political purpose or motivation, but which also
included some elements of an ordinary crime.
B. The Present-Day Political Offense Exception
In the 20th century, although the political offense exception has
become a viable part of the normal processes of extradition law, doctri-
nal hesitations still persist regarding the concept of a political offense.
Three separate tests have emerged from the jurisprudence of the courts
to deal with this problem of defining a political offense; this jurispru-
dence has particular relevance in determining whether a terrorist act
constitutes a political offense for the purposes of extradition.29 The first
test is known as the traditional Anglo-American test, under which
24. See, e.g., S. SINHA, supra note 19, at 18.
25. See, e.g., id at 19.
26. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 390-91 (1905). See also Reale, stra
note 19, at 545.
27. See, e.g., L. KoZIEBRODZKI, supra note 19, at 43-45.
28. See I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 392.
29. For a detailed description and analysis of these various approaches, see, e.g., I.
SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (1971); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of
Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1240-56
(1962).
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crimes are considered to be political offenses if they are incidental to
and committed in the furtherance of a political disturbance.
The Swiss test-known as the predominance test--contrasts with
the Anglo-American version in that a crime is deemed to be a political
offense only if its political aspects outweigh its common elements. Of
the three tests to be discussed, it is the most flexible and allows the
courts the greatest discretion.
Finally, the French courts in their early decisions on this matter
articulated what became known as the objective test. Under this for-
mulation, the category of political offenses is restricted to those crimes
which directly injure the rights of the state, ie., to what are known as
purely political crimes. The French version was by far the most restric-
tive and rigorous definition of what constituted a political crime. The
utility of this formulation was short-lived; in recent decisions, the
French courts have abandoned the objective approach and adopted a
test which resembles the ohe used by the Swiss courts.
L The 4nglo-American Model
In English jurisprudence, In re Castioni3 ° is the landmark case in
the area of the extradition of would-be political offenders. In that case,
the divisional court refused the extradition request of the Swiss Gov-
ernment for one of its nationals who had participated in an armed at-
tack on a government building in which a government official was
shot.31 In its opinion, the court outlined the two major elements of the
test used to determine whether a given act constitutes a political of-
fense. It held that the acts of the accused must be "incidental to and
form. . . part of political disturbances' 32 and that they must be "in the
furtherance" 33 of those same disturbances.
Despite the recognition of a special status for political crimes, even
at the end of the nineteenth century, the exemption afforded to political
offenders was not construed by the English courts to apply to terrorist-
like acts. In a subsequent case,34 the divisional court granted the Swiss
Government's extradition request for an anarchist who had bombed a
caf6 and an army barracks, notwithstanding the contentions of the ac-
cused that the explosion at the barracks constituted an attempt to de-
30. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
31. Id at 150.
32. Id at 165-66.
33. Id at 166-67.
34. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415. See also Pillet & Rafin, Bulletin de la Juriiru-
dence Anglaise, 22 .1 DRL INVeL. 643, 643-45 (1895).
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stroy government property and was, therefore, a political offense."
Noting that anarchists were "the enemy of all Governments," 36 the
court reasoned that, in order for there to be a political offense, "there
must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the
Government of their own choice on the other, and that... the offense is
committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that objective
"37
Political developments in the 20th century led to the elaboration of
an exception in English jurisprudence to the rule that a political offense
must be incidental to and in furtherance of a two-party struggle for
political power. These exceptional circumstances involve the request
for the extradition of an individual who has fled from a totalitarian
regime. For example, in one case,38 the Polish Government requested
the extradition from England of seven Polish sailors who had taken
over their fishing vessel and sailed it to an English port to seek political
asylum. During the extradition proceeding, the sailors alleged that a
political officer had recorded their conversations while at sea in order
to prosecute them for their political opinions upon their return to Po-
land.39 Despite the fact that the Polish request was based upon extra-
ditable offenses and that there was no political disturbance to justify
the crimes of the sailors, the divisional court denied the extradition re-
quest.40 The court expanded the meaning of the term political offense
by taking into consideration the fact that the request for extradition
was made by a totalitarian regime for persons who were opposed to it.4'
The English rule relating to the definition of a political offense has
been applied by United States courts since the end of the 19th century.
It was first incorporated into the holding of In re Ezela,a2 in which the
Salvadorean Government requested that persons be extradited from
the United States on charges of murder and robbery. In their defense,
the fugitives contended that the crimes for which they were sought were
political in character because they had been committed during their
unsuccessful attempt to thwart a revolutionary uprising. 3
35. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 417, 419.
36. Id at 419.
37. Id
38. Exparte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
39. Id at 543.
40. Id at 542.
41. Id at 544.
42. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
43. Id at 977-78.
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Relying upon the reasoning of the English court in Castioni,4 the
United States court agreed with the fugitives' contentions and denied
the extradition request on the ground that the crimes for which extradi-
tion was sought were political offenses. 45 Since the decision in Ezeta,
United States courts have applied the English rule consistently in litiga-
tion involving the extradition of alleged political offenders. For exam-
ple, in a recent case,"4 one federal court restated and affirmed the
validity of the English rule, holding that in order for crimes to consti-
tute political offenses "there must be an 'uprising,' and... the acts in
question must be incidental to it."'47
2- The Predominance Approach of the Swiss Courts
The Swiss courts have elaborated a somewhat more complex
methodology than the English incidence rule to define a political of-
fense. This development stems in large measure from the fact that the
Federal Extradition Law4 8 gives the judiciary broad discretion to assess
the factual context in which an act took place and to determine whether
it amounts to a political offense. Specifically, the law provides that
"[tihe Federal Tribunal liberally construes in each particular instance
the character of the infraction according to the facts of the case." 49
In assessing the character of a crime, the Swiss courts look not
only to whether the act was an incident of a political disturbance, but
also to other factors, e.g., the offender's personal motive as well as the
relationship between his alleged purpose and the means he employed
to achieve that purpose. In the relevant litigation, the Swiss courts
have focused upon both the objective and subjective factors of an inci-
dent in order to reach a determination as to the character of the crime
for which extradition is sought. They weigh the political aspects of the
act against its common elements to determine which of the two features
predominates over the other. This method of evaluating an offense is
tailor-made to assess whether a crime for which extradition is requested
is a political offense. In a word, the Swiss approach meets head on the
most complex and most difficult problem in the extradition cases in-
volving alleged political offenders.
44. Id at 997.
45. Id at 999.
46. In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
47. Id at 721.
48. The Federal Extradition Law of January 22, 1892, reprinted in Garcia-Mora, supra
note 29, at 1252.
49. Id
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The basic features of the Swiss predominance test are illustrated
by the reasoning and holding of an early case. In in re Ockerl, 50 Prus-
sia had requested the extradition from Switzerland of a German na-
tional wanted on murder charges. The accused, a member of a militant
political faction who had participated in a violent confrontation be-
tween opposing factions, allegedly killed another militant during the
encounter. In his defense, Ockert contended that his crime was a politi-
cal offense." In denying the extradition request, the Federal Tribunal
considered evidence of attendant circumstances which depicted the en-
counter as a political clash. 2 It held that "acts which have the charac-
ter of an ordinary crime appearing in the list of extraditable offenses
but which, because of the attendant circumstances, in particular be-
cause of the motive and the object, are of a predominantly political
complexion"5 3 are to be considered political offenses.
Like the English courts, the Swiss tribunals have modified their
established judicial approach to take into account the fact that crimes
may be committed by offenders in order to flee from totalitarian re-
gimes. In a case decided in the early 1950's,54 the Yugoslav Govern-
ment requested the extradition from Switzerland of three nationals who
had hijacked the plane on which they worked to seek asylum in Swit-
zerland. The Federal Tribunal denied the extradition request, reason-
ing that the purpose and the motive of the hijacking, to flee a
totalitarian regime, gave the offense "a distinctly political colouring."55
While the predominance test may be used to justify crimes which
were committed "to escape the constraint of a State which makes all
opposition.., impossible,"56 it is unlikely, in a situation other than one
involving an escape from a totalitarian regime, that the status of a po-
litical crime would be attributed to terrorist-like acts under the Swiss
test. The holding in one early case corroborates this view. In In re
Kafphengst,57 Prussia requested the extradition from Switzerland of the
accused, who along with several accomplices, had committed a number
of bombings, injuring one bystander and causing substantial damage to
private property. Kaphengst claimed that the charges for which he was
sought were political offenses, alleging that they had been committed to
50. 7 Ann. Dig. 369, 370 (Fed. Trib. Switz., 1938).
51. Id
52. Id
53. Id at 370.
54. In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic, 19 I.L.R. 371 (Fed. Trib. Switz., 1952).
55. Id
56. Id at 374.
57. 5 Ann. Dig. 292 (Fed. Ct., Switz, 1930).
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further the ends of a political movement.5" The Swiss court, however,
granted the Prussian extradition request for two major reasons.
First, the court deemed the acts to be purely terrorist acts, not a
series of actions aiming at an immediate overthrow of the State, and
refused to consider the acts as relative political crimes on the basis of
an incidence rationale.5 9 Second, the court ruled that the alleged politi-
cal motivation of the actor could not constitute a justification of his
criminal conduct since the means he employed were not proportionate
to the aim sought.60 Using this analysis, the court concluded that "the
danger to innocent people brought about by the bomb outrages...
[was so] predominant. . . as to prevail completely over the political
aspect of the act."61 The holding in this case, and in others,6 2 indicates
that where particularly heinous and violent acts are involved, the politi-
cal motive and purpose of the offender alone will not be determinative.
In order to satisfy the requirements of the predominance test, such
crimes must meet a rigid ends-means test under which the act must be
indispensable to the furtherance of the end pursued.
3. The French Test
The jurisprudence of the French courts in this area is harder to
define than the approach adopted by the English and Swiss courts.
French case law has undergone some significant transformations.
Moreover, the current evolution of the judicial doctrine on extradition
has not yet stabilized; thus a clear-cut definition of the present test used
by the French courts is not easy to elaborate.
On its face, the French extradition statute 63 contains a political
offense exception which appears to follow the requirements of the
traditional Anglo-American incidence test.' The legislative history of
Article 5(2) of the extradition law reveals that the provision was in-
58. Id
59. Id at 292-93.
60. Id at 293.
61. Id.
62. E.g., In re Peruzzo, 19 I.L.R. 369 (Fed. Trib., Switz., 1952); In re Ficorilli, 18 I.L.R.
345 (Fed. Trib., Switz., 1951); In re Nappi, 19 LL.R. 375 (Fed. Trib., Switz., 1952).
63. Law of March 10, 1927, [1927] J.O. 2874, 1 GAZ. PALAIS 1018.
64. Article 5(2) fo the Law of March 10, 1927 provides in relevant part that extradition
should not be granted:
when the crime or offense has a political character or when it is clear from the
circumstances that the extradition is requested for a political end.
As to acts committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war by one of
the other parties engaged in the conflict and in the furtherance.., of its purpose,
they may not be grounds for extradition unless they constitute acts of odious bar-
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tended to exempt from extraditable offenses a broad range of crimes, its
purpose being "to assure as complete an immunity as possible."65 In
contrast to the explicit language of the provision, the legislators who
drafted the statute wanted the concept of a political offense to encom-
pass the subjective motivation of the offender as well as the circum-
stances in which he committed his offense. 66
The French courts appear to have had little regard for the underly-
ing intent of the statutory provision in their early extradition decisions.
The landmark case in the early French jurisprudence was decided
shortly after World War II. In In re Giovanni GaI1i,67 the Cour d'appe/
of Grenoble considered the request of the Republic of San Marino for
the extradition from France of one of its nationals who had been con-
victed of attempted murder and sentenced to a 12-year prison term.
According to the record, the accused had fired several shots at a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. Gatti, however, asserted that his action
had been "uncontestably political" in character.6 The court granted
the extradition request, reasoning in effect that only those offenders
who had committed such acts as espionage or treason could lay claim
to the political offense exception.69 Despite the legislative history of the
extradition statute revealing that the term political offense should apply
to the acts of all "those which the ardor of political passion alone led
.. . to violate the law,"70 the Grenoble court totally disregarded the
actor's subjective motivation and adopted a purely objective definition
of the concept of a political offense, limiting it to acts which directly
injure the rights of the state.71 In other words, the French court re-
solved the issue of the status of relative political crimes in extradition
law by disregarding the issue altogether.
After the Gatti decision, French courts continued to rely upon the
objective test. It was applied, most notably, in a series of cases involv-
ing the extradition of Belgian nationals who had fled to France after
having been accused of war-time collaboration with the enemy.72 In
barism and vandalism prohibited by the laws of war, and only when the civil war
has ended.
Law of March 10, 1927, [1927] J.O. 2874, 2875, 1 GAz. PALAIS 1018, 1019,
65. Senate Debates of Dec. 10, 1926, [1926] J.O. 1734.
66. See Travers, supra note 11, at 601-02, 609-10.
67. 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Cours d'appel, Grenoble, 1947).
68. Id
69. See id at 145-46.
70. Senate Debates of Dec. 10, 1926, [1926] J.O. 1734.
71. In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Cours d'appel, Grenoble, 1947),
72. Eg., In re Spiessens, Cour d'appel, Colmar, [1953] RecueUl Dalloz, Jurlspndence
[D. Jur.] 604.
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most of these cases, the French courts refused to grant the extradition
requests on the ground that crimes against the security of the state con-
stituted purely political offenses.73
The French courts, however, soon manifested their disenchant-
ment with the rigor and restrictiveness of the objective test. In a case
decided shortly after the war-time collaboration cases, the Cour d'appel
of Paris reoriented the tenets of French jurisprudence towards the
adoption of a test which closely paralleled the predominance approach
of the Swiss courts. In In re Rodriguez,74 the Spanish Government re-
quested the extradition from France of two of its nationals who alleg-
edly had committed a variety of serious crimes in Spain, including
arson and murder. The accused, however, contended that the Spanish
Government had fabricated those charges in order to prosecute them
for their opposition to the Franco regime.75 In reaching its decision to
deny extradition, the Cour d'appel of Paris relied heavily upon evi-
dence indicating that both men were part of organized movements
seeking to overthrow the existing Spanish regime.76 The court con-
cluded that the crimes for which extradition was sought were "at least
relative political offenses" 77 and denied the extradition request.78 Here,
the court in effect weighed the political aspects of the charges against
their common elements to arrive at an assessment of their predominant
character.
In recent extradition cases, the French courts have resorted to the
approach used in the Rodriguez case rather than apply the require-
ments of the objective test. They have looked to the kinds of circum-
stances in which the alleged political offense was committed and have
considered the offender's motivation. Since these cases confirm a sig-
nificant shift in the jurisprudence of the French courts in this area, each
of them will be considered in some detail.
The first case to come down in this area was In re Hennin. 9
There, the Swiss Government requested the extradition from France of
one of its nationals who was wanted in Switzerland on a number of
serious charges including several counts of arson directed mostly at pri-
73. Id
74. Cour d'appel, Paris, [1953] 2 GAz. PALtS 113.
75. Id
76. Id at 114.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Cour d'appel, Paris, [1967] Juris-Classeur periodique, la semaine juridique [J.C.P.
II] No. 15274.
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vate property.s0 Despite the terrorist-like character of his activities, the
accused contended that his acts had been committed with a political
motive and in a purely political context.81 In light of this allegation,
the court requested that the Swiss Government submit additional infor-
mation regarding the accused and the circumstances in which the
crimes had been committed. 2
The additional documentation established that the accused had no
previous criminal record and that, according to a psychiatric expert, he
was a political fanatic whose acts were the result of his political convic-
tions. Moreover, it appeared that the acts had been committed in the
context of an intense local political climate.8 3 Having considered this
supplementary documentation, the Cour d'appel of Paris ruled that
Hennin's crimes, however regrettable and blameworthy they might be,
were acts committed from political motivation and for a political pur-
pose and that, as a consequence, he was exempt from extradition 4
In In re nacio de Palma,85 the same court considered a case in
which the Portuguese Government sought the extradition of one of its
nationals on the charge of armed robbery. The accused, along with his
accomplices, had entered a bank in Portugal and taken a considerable
amount of money at gunpoint. As in Hennin, the accused contended
that his crime had been done for a political purpose.8 6 The Court
d'appel again requested that the Portuguese Government supply it with
additional information regarding the accused and the commission of
the offense.87 The supplementary documentation established that the
accused had been tried previously in Portugal for crimes of a political
character and that he was well known for his militant political activ-
ity.88 On the basis of this information, the court denied the request for
extradition on the ground that the crime for which the accused was
sought was a political offense. Despite the seriousness of the crime
upon which the extradition request was based, the court concluded that
the act was connected to the political activity of the accused.89 The
liberal reasoning of the court in this case is in marked contrast with the
80. I1d
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id
85. Cour d'appel, Paris, [1967] J.C.P. II No. 15386.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id
89. Id
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position of the court in Gatti. It clearly shows the emergence of a trend
among the French courts to favor the right of asylum and the freedom
of political expression over the international interest in the punishment
of criminal activity.
The most recent decision in this area of litigation confirms the
existence of the trend established by the two previous decisions. The
case of Astudillo-Calleja9° was decided by the Conseil d'dtat in mid-
June 1977. There, the Spanish Government requested the extradition
of the accused on bank robbery and other theft charges. The accused,
however, had a long history of opposition to the Spanish regime. He
was, for example, the son of militant Spanish republicans who had died
for their political cause; he had refused to be inducted into the army
and was sentenced to a prison term; and he received additional prison
sentences for charges relating to the dissemination of political propa-
ganda against the government and the army.9' While serving his
prison sentence, he escaped and fled to France. Sometime later, the
accused re-entered Spain clandestinely to commit various thefts and
then returned to France.92 The Spanish Government maintained that
the acts of the accused did not have, in objective terms, a political char-
acter and that it could not be contended that they were inspired by a
political motive.93 A lower French court ruled that the accused should
be extradited since the acts for which he was wanted were common
crimes.94
On appeal, the Conseil d'dtat reversed that decision, ruling that, in
light of the accused's past opposition to the political regime in Spain,
the extradition request had been made for a political end." The court's
intent to afford the accused the right of asylum despite his criminal
activity was manifest.96 There may be reason to believe, although this
reasoning is purely conjectural, that the outcome of this case aligns it-
self with those cases in English and Swiss practice in which an expan-
sive interpretation was given to the political offense exception in order
to permit the accused to escape a totalitarian regime. It should be re-
called that the extradition request was made at the time when Franco
held power in Spain.
90. Conseil d'etat, 105 J. DR. INr'tL 73,76 (1978); [19771 D.S. Jur. at 695, 699; JurfLpru.
dence, 2 GAZ. PALAIS 640 (1977).
91. D.S. Jur., supra note 90, at 695.
92. Id
93. Id at 699.
94. I1d at 695.
95. Id at 699.
96. 2 GAz. PALAts, supra note 90, at 642.
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It is clear from these cases that the French courts have abandoned
the objective test elaborated in the Gaul decision. Although it is not
possible to affix a precise label to their present methodology, it appears
that the French courts have given primacy to their discretion in these
matters, and that they have adopted the ad hoc approach characteristic
of Swiss practice. While looking to the seriousness of the crime for
which extradition is sought and the common elements of the act, the
French courts also take into consideration the circumstances in which
the act was committed and the offender's motivation by requesting the
introduction of evidence to that effect.
The provisions of the French extradition statute allow the courts to
deny an extradition request not only on the ground that the crime of
the accused constitutes a political offense, but also when the court
deems that the extradition request was made for a political end. It is
fair to say that, by adopting an extremely flexible definition of a politi-
cal crime and of the political end that can underlie an extradition re-
quest, the French courts have given primacy to the subjective and
circumstantial character of the cases involving the extradition of al-
leged political offenders and have lessened the importance formerly at-
tached to the international repression of criminal activity by the
objective test. In any event, the French judiciary now is prepared to
deal doctrinally with the problem of relative political crimes.
However enlightened this approach may appear, it should be
pointed out that its application to cases involving the extradition of
transnational terrorists could have serious repercussions upon the inter-
national struggle to bring legal sanctions to bear against terrorists. Un-
like the English and Swiss case law, there is no precedent in the French
jurisprudence which establishes conclusively that terrorist or terrorist-
like acts are outside the purview of the political offense exception. In-
deed, the outcome and reasoning of In re Hennin and of some of the
other cases indicate that there are some grounds for believing that,
under certain circumstances, the French courts would not be averse to
denying the extradition of a terrorist based upon the reasoning that his
acts were a political crime.
In addition to the English and Swiss cases cited previously, there is
some evidence in contemporary international practice indicating that
terrorist crimes are without the substantive provisions of the political
offense exception. Most courts ruling in cases involving the extradition
of transnational terrorists have taken a restrictive view of the applica-
bility of the political offense exception and have adopted a narrow con-
struction of its substance when dealing with terrorist acts. For
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example, Canadian courts extradited a United States national to the
United States on charges relating to the bombing of university build-
ings despite the contentions of the accused that his acts were the symbol
of his protest against the United States involvement in Vietnam. 97 A
British court extradited another terrorist on the ground that it inter-
preted the political offense exception to apply only to acts of political
opposition to the state requesting extradition.9" Finally, the Supreme
Court of Greece, in reversing a lower court decision concerning the
extradition of Rolf Pohle-a member of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist
gang99-declared that it was subscribing to "a very narrow definition of
a political crime"' under which it took the political offense exception
"to cover only actions aiming directly at overthrowing the existing sys-
tem, not all those prompted by political ideas or motives."''t The
French position on this matter has not been as clear-cut, nor has the
outcome of the French judicial decisions been as uniform.
IV.THE EXTRADITION OF TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISTS BY FRENCH COURTS 02
In the last five years, the Cour d'appel of Paris has been called
upon to rule in a number of cases involving the extradition of transna-
tional terrorists from France. These cases constitute a line of jurispru-
dence which has enabled the French court to address and consider the
general body of legal problems to which the extradition of transna-
tional terrorists gives rise. Most significantly, in the majority of these
cases, the court has had to grapple, either explicitly or implicitly, with
97. Re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong, 28 D.L.R.3d 513 (1972). afd32 D.LR.3d
265 (1973). For a lengthy analysis of this case, see Note, As)'um or Accessorr The Non-
Surrender of Political Offenders by Canada, 31 U. TORONTO FAc. L REv. 93 (1973).
98. Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] A.C. 931 (H.L.); Le Figaro, Sept.
20, 1979, at 13, col. 2 (indicating that a British court also had extradited Astrid Proll, a
member of the Baader terrorist gang, on June 23, 1979).
99. The court of appeals in Athens refused the request of the West German Govern-
ment for Pohle's extradition on the ground that "his acts were those of a genuine revolution-
ary, and that they were not a criminal but a political offense." Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 1976, § A,
at 24, col. 1.
100. The Times (London), Oct. 2, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
101. 261 THE ECONOMIST 65, 65 (1976).
102. In this section dealing with the French jurisprudence on the extradition of
transnational terrorists, the author has relied on the information contained in two previous
studies. See Note, The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Releare of Abu Daoud by French
Authorities, 17 VA. J. IN'L L. 495 (1977); Carbonneau, Extradition and Transnational
Terrorism: A Comment on the Recent Extradition of Klaus Croissant from France to IVest
Germany, 12 INT'L LAWYER 813 (1978). The substance of these two previous studies,
however, has been updated and revised for the purposes of the present article.
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the difficult task of defining the role that the'political offense exception
is to play in extradition litigation. In all these cases, the court has had
to contend with the external political circumstances surrounding the
case, and its response to these external elements has varied. Moreover,
although the corpus of cases is fairly limited in number, the decisions
rendered in these cases at least can be said to constitute the beginnings
of a doctrinal pronouncement, a nascent attempt to deal judicially with
the legal problems that attend the request for the extradition of a trans-
national terrorist.
It should be stated at the outset that the progression of this juris-
prudence has been uneven and somewhat inconsistent. In its first deci-
sions, the court seems to have faltered by deviating from the long-
standing tradition of judicial neutrality and independence. The out-
come of these first cases was based upon a reasoning which was influ-
enced by external political circumstances rather than by the doctrinal
substance of the issues raised by the case. The Cour d'appel's latest
decisions have been more acceptable from a doctrinal standpoint and
more satisfying from the perspective of efforts aimed at controlling and
repressing international criminality. Rather than promoting the
would-be political rights of the terrorists, the more recent decisions of
the court have emphasized the need to bring legal sanctions to bear
against the perpetrators of heinous criminal acts.
To the knowledge of the writer, In re Holder & Kerhoiv' 0 3 was the
first decision to be rendered by the Cour d'appel in a case involving the
extradition of contemporary transnational terrorists. Although the out-
come of the case is significant from the standpoint of the political of-
fense exception, this decision was not published in the relevant French
law journals and it failed to capture the attention of both French and
American legal commentators. In that case, the United States Govern-
ment requested that two United States nationals be extradited from
France. The two fugitives were wanted on charges relating to the 1972
hijacking of a plane on a flight from Los Angeles to Seattle.0 4 In an
astonishing decision, the French court ruled that the extradition request
should be refused on the ground that the act for which the accused
were wanted constituted a political offense. 0 5 The record of the pro-
ceeding, however, contained precious little indication of political moti-
vation on the part of the two hijackers.
103. For a report of the facts of and the decision in, this case E. MCDOWELL, DIOEST Op
UNITED STATES PRACTICa IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at168 (1975).
104. Id at 169.
105. Id
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The evidence establishing political motivation was that during the
incident one of the hijackers had ordered that the aircraft be flown in
the direction of Hanoi but, when he was provided with a plane that
could fly that distance, he changed his mind. The only other evidence
of political motivation on the part of the hijackers was to the effect that
they had made some vague allusions to Angela Davis and Eldridge
Cleaver during the episode.°" It was upon the basis of this rather weak
evidence that the Cour d'appel ruled that the two fugitives were wanted
for a political offense, despite the contentions of the United States Gov-
ernment that hijacking was an ordinary criminal act, especially when it
resulted in the extortion of $500,000 from the airline company. 07
The reasoning of the court in the Holder case represents a depar-
ture from what courts in other countries have concluded in regard to
the applicability of the political offense exception in the terrorist con-
text. It also reflects a certain estrangement on the part of the court from
even the lax doctrine established in the Hennin et al cases. There was
no evidence in Holder showing that the accused acted from a political
motivation that inspired both their immediate and long-range goals;
that their act was committed in an intense political climate; that they
were political fanatics whose every act was dedicated to advancing
their political convictions; or that they would have been the victims of
political persecution if they had been returned to the United States.
The factual context of the incident points to a confused and not very
well defined intention to hijack an airplane. The remunerative purpose
of the venture was clear, but its political coloration is only vaguely ap-
parent, if not invisible. The court must have been at some pains to
apply the political offense concept in this case since, from a doctrinal
perspective, the all-inclusive generality of the implicit definition it ad-
vanced could accommodate almost any criminal act provided the ac-
tors involved at least mention something of a political nature.
One cannot help but conclude that there was something very "un-
juridicial" and "undoctrinal" about the court's reasoning and that the
underlying motivation of the decision resided elsewhere than in the le-
gal fabric of the case itself. It should be recalled that, at the time the
decision was rendered, the United States still was involved in the Viet-
nam conflict and that the French Government had become very critical
of the United States policy in Vietnam. Although it is impossible to
corroborate this interpretation with concrete evidence, it seems that the
106. Id at 171.
107. Id at 172.
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fundamental rationale of the Holder opinion lies in that external politi-
cal factor.
Rather than act as the impartial arbiter of legal issues, the court
chose to assume the role of spokesperson for French national political
opinions, declaring in ex cathedra fashion that hijacking, on the basis
of flimsy evidence was a political offense for which extradition would
not lie. Why the court acted in this way remains somewhat of a mys-
tery. It did have the option of confining its consideration to the proce-
dural and legal issues presented and leaving the political decision on
extradition to the executive branch. Perhaps dressing the decision in
the garb ofjudicial neutrality was a way to avoid an embarassing polit-
ical decision for the national government. Be that as it may, the appar-
ent abandonment of judicial impartiality by the court was a sad
commentary upon the French judiciary and augured ill for future cases
involving the extradition of transnational terrorists and the interna-
tional repression of criminal activity.
The Abu Daoud case was the second decision to come down in this
line ofjurisprudence.10 8 Here, although the Cour d'appel's decision re-
ceived considerable journalistic and legal commentary, 0 9 it did little to
enhance the court's reputation as an independent tribunal. According
to many commentators, the court not only voiced the political opinions
of the national government, but it also acquiesced to executive branch
pressure to reach a certain legal result that was politically expedient.I10
The court's considerations were limited exclusively to procedural mat-
ters. Therefore, it did not address the question of whether the terrorist
acts in question constituted political offenses. The procedural holdings
of the court in this matter merit discussion, however, in that they are
instructive of the court's general attitude at this time towards the extra-
dition of transnational terrorists.
Abu Daoud, allegedly an organizer of the 1972 Munich Olympics
massacre, entered France under a false identity in early January 1977
as part of an official PLO delegation. Later that same day, the West
108. There is only one official report which deals with this case. That report, however,
only deals with part of the decision. For reports of the case, see Ct. of Appeal, Paris, Fr,, 104
J. DR. INT'L-CLUNET 843, 844 (1977); Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 2, col. 1 (reporting the
French Ministry of Justice's official summary of the court's decision); Roubache, A Propos
De Drolt, 51-53 GAz. PALAIS (1977).
109. E.g., Rubin, 4bu Daoud Case: Flouting WorldLaw, Christian Science Monitor, Jan,
27, 1977, at 27, col. I; Note, The.4buDaoudAffair, I 1 J. INTL L. & ECON. 539 (1977); Recent
Developments-International Terrorism: Extradition, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467 (1977).
110. Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1977, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 20, col, 1;
The Times (London), Jan. 12, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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German police furnished their French counterparts with information
indicating Daoud's true identity."' The French police brought him in
to verify his papers and later detained him for questioning. During the
next several days, the West German and Israeli Governments an-
nounced that they would make requests for Daoud's extradition from
France on charges relating to the 1972 Munich incident. The Israeli
request would also include charges relating to Abu Daoud's complicity
in other acts of terrorism carried out in Israel. Upon the basis of the
West German and Israeli requests, Abu Daoud was placed under pro-
visional arrest by the French authorities.
The day after the Israeli request had been made, the Cour d'appel
convened in camera to rule upon the legality of the continued provi-
sional detention of Abu Daoud." 2 The defense argued that the West
German arrest warrant and the forthcoming Israeli extradition request
were invalid on a number of technical legal grounds. After a brief de-
liberation, the Cour d'appel Concluded that the principal defense argu-
ments were correct. The court held that, since the West German arrest
warrant had not been confirmed through diplomatic channels as re-
quired by the applicable extradition convention, there were no legal
grounds upon which to justify Abu Daoud's continued provisional de-
tention pending the anticipated extradition request. In regard to the
Israeli request, the court held that no action could be taken on the re-
quest to hold Abu Daoud in custody in the absence of any act within
the scope of the French-Israeli extradition agreement in effect in 1972.
The court therefore concluded that Abu Daoud should be set free and
the suspected terrorist left France the same afternoon on a flight to Al-
giers.1 13
The arrest of Abu Daoud placed the French Government in an
exceedingly difficult diplomatic position." 4 On the one hand, French
officials had taken a strong public stand against transnational terror-
ism; on the other hand, they had cultivated relations with the Arab
countries.' Prior to the arrest, the President of France had announced
plans for an official visit to Saudi Arabia to discuss an oil supply agree-
111. The following summary of the facts of the case was obtained from the Agence
France-Presse Interview with Raymond Barre, Prime Minister of France, in Paris (Jan. 13,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Barre interview] (transcript obtained from the Informaton Service
of the French Embassy, Washington, D.C.). A report of the Barre interview is found in N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1977, § A, at 1, col 4.
112. .d
113. Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 2, coL 1.
114. The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, coL 4.
115. Le Monde, Jan. 13, 1977, at 14, coL 3.
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ment, 1 6 and the French Government also was about to close a $150
million defense deal with Egypt." 7 Moreover, government officials
were secretly negotiating with Libya to obtain the release of a French
anthropologist who had been held as a hostage by Chad rebels for over
two years." 8 The detention and possible extradition of Abu Daoud
posed a serious threat to a French economy that is almost totally de-
pendent upon Arab oil. Finally, some form of terrorist blackmail could
be anticipated, threatening the security of France. 119
After Abu Daoud was released, many Western governments and
journalists criticized the decision of the French court as having been
politically motivated. The court, they contended, had yielded to the
pressure of the French Government which, in turn, had succumbed to
possible Arab oil threats and terrorist blackmail. 21 Since proof of di-
rect interference is not available, one might argue that the decision sim-
ply reflected the personal view of the judges as to what was best for
their country in these circumstances. The highly technical reasoning of
the court and the perfect suitability of its conclusions as a legal justifi-
cation of a foregone political conclusion, however, make that argument
unacceptable.
The more plausible, albeit extreme, explanation of what happened
is executive interference with the theoretically independent judiciary.
Although the French court never reached the substantive question of
whether the terrorist acts imputed to Abu Daoud were of a political
nature, the technical character of the procedural holdings seems to in-
dicate that political factors made themselves felt. This apparent con-
sideration of extrajudicial criteria not only hinders the eventual
punishment of transnational terrorists, but also lessens the viability of
the courts as an independent institution of government and their capac-
ity to dispense justice impartially. In the final analysis, the Abu Daoud
case underscores the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reconciling
the immediate interests of a state with the long-range goals of a coher-
ent international policy against transnational terrorism.
The outcome and reasoning of the third decision in this line of
cases represent a substantial reorientation of the French jurisprudence
116. The Times (London), Jan. 11, 1977, at 6, col. 5.
117. Barre Interview, supra note 110, at 2.
118. Le Monde, Feb. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 3; id Feb. 2, 1977, at 2, col. 1; id Feb. 3, 1977, at
1, col. 2.
119. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 1.
120. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
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in this area. In the Klaus Croissant extradition case,12' the Cour
d'appel reached an independent determination exclusively on the basis
of the legal issues presented by the case.' " There, the Paris police ar-
rested Klaus Croissant, a West German national and a former attorney
for members of the Baader-Meinhof gang, on September 30, 1977. On
July 10, 1977, Croissant, released on bail and pending trial on charges
of aiding a criminal group, left Germay to seek refuge in France. On
July 15, a Stuttgart court issued an international warrant for Crois-
sant's arrest, charging, inter alia, that he had aided a criminal group
and propagandized on its behalf. On July 19, the West German Gov-
ernment, pursuant to the provisions of its extradition convention with
France, requested Croissant's extradition from France on the basis of
the charges contained in the Stuttgart warrant. On September 30, the
Federal Tribunal in Karlsruhe issued a second international warrant
for Croissant's arrest which implicated him directly in more recent ter-
rorist incidents. On October. 1, the West German Government made a
second request for Croissant's extradition on the basis of the Karlsruhe
warrant.
French judicial action on the merits of the case was delayed sev-
eral times owing to the practical difficulty of translating and consider-
ing West German documents.'2 Finally, on November 16, the Cour
d'appel rendered a "partially favorable" decision, granting the extradi-
tion request for only one of the charges contained in the Stuttgart arrest
warrant. 124 The court ruled that Croissant could be extradited "for
[his] having, as a lawyer, contributed to organizing and operating an
information system between imprisoned terrorists and others in liberty
by transmitting correspondence, instructions and documents favoring,
as a consequence, their activities". 12
The Cour d'appel's consideration of the merits of the case reflected
a high and unimpeachable standard of judicial conduct; accusations of
judicial subservience to executive branch opinions and assessments of
political exigencies cannot properly be levied at the court. 126 The court
121. No official report of the decision rendered by the Cour d'appel, Paris, has yet been
reported in the relevant French law journals. For a report of the decision see, Le Figaro,
Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, coL 3.
122. For a report of the facts of this case, Le Monde, Oct. 2-3, 1977, at 7, col. 1; Id Oct. 5,
1977, at 16, col. 5; id Nov. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
123. Id
124. Le Figaro, Nov. 17, 1977, at 17, coL 3.
125. Id
126. For the following analysis of the case, the author has relied extensively on a previ-
ous study. Carbonneau, supra note 102, at 819-21.
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gave close scrutiny to the charges contained in both arrest warrants. It
held that the charges contained in the Karlsruhe warrant constituted
inadequate grounds for extradition, declaring that they lacked a suffi-
cient evidentiary base to be a valid ground for extradition. In regard to
the charges contained in the Stuttgart warrant, the court refused to
grant the extradition request on the basis of the charge that Croissant
had aided a criminal group by propagandizing on its behalf. The court
ruled that, under French law, such crimes could not be a ground for
extradition. The court rendered only a "partially favorable" decision
based upon the charge that Croissant, in his capacity as a lawyer, had
acted as an information link between imprisoned terrorists and others
in liberty and, hence, favored their activities.
The court's opinion was a subtle piece of judicial reasoning. By
disregarding certain charges for evidentiary reasons, the court avoided
confronting the problem of having to draw an explicit substantive dis-
tinction between activities which allegedly have a political character
and those which are solely criminal. The charge that Croissant had
aided the "Red Army" faction, described in the arrest warrant as a
"criminal group", by propagandizing on its behalf borders, by any defi-
nition of the term, upon the political. To have considered the charge as
a viable ground for extradition would have required the court to con-
sider the concept of relative political crimes and to engage in the task of
distinguishing criminal complicity with a terrorist group from genuine
political acts. Indeed, such an orientation might have led to the refusal
of the extradition request since the court could have held that non-
violent acts, although they are associated with a terrorist group, when
they are pursued solely to further a set of political convictions, are not
crimes per se, but rather fall within the scope of the political offense
exception to extradition. The possible impact on the instant case
notwithstanding, it is in some ways regrettable that the Cour d'appel
did not venture down this doctrinal road. Such a substantive holding
would have gone far to refine the current law dealing with the applica-
bility of the political offense exception to cases involving the extradi-
tion of transnational terrorists.
The court did grant the extradition request for a charge which was
distinctly more criminal than political in character. As a consequence,
the application of the political offense exception to the case became
irrelevant, and instead the court relied, at least tacitly, upon the princi-
ple that Croissant's forthcoming trial in West Germany would be lim-
ited solely to the criminal charges. The importance of the Croissant
decision should not be minimized. Not only were legal sanctions
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brought to bear against an individual who had allegedly aided and
abetted terrorists in their activities, but also the French court had estab-
lished a precedent which contrasted markedly with its previous deci-
sions in the area and could serve to support the contention that
"terrorists should be judged according to their a'cts, not their inten-
tions". 127
In subsequent litigation, 28 the Conseil d'etat upheld the legality of
the French Government's decision to extradite Croissant. Following
the decision by the Cour d'appel, Croissant lodged an action with the
Conseil d'etat in which he contended that his extradition to West Ger-
many should not take place on twelve grounds. 29 One of Croissant's
principal arguments centered upon the concept of political crime. He
maintained that the charge upon which his extradition had been
granted was a political offense and that the applicable extradition con-
vention did not permit extradition for acts of this character. 30 The
Conseil d'etat rejected all of Croissant's arguments including his con-
tention that he was a political offender.' 3'
The court reasoned that the charge of furnishing aid to persons
who committed crimes was not political in its purpose despite the fact
that the purpose of the crime was described in the arrest warrant as "to
topple the established order in the Federal Republic of Germany". 32
Nor was, according to the court, the allegation that this act had been
committed in order to have the rights of defendants respected sufficient
to give the infraction a political character. The court concluded that
the aid furnished to the imprisoned individuals had allowed them to
pursue their criminal activity and that the seriousness of the charge
prevented it from having a political character. 3 3
According to a French commentator,"3 the decision of the Conseil
d'etat re-established, to some extent, the objective norms for defining a
political offense, namely, limiting it to those acts which touch the State
in its political or social organization. By this analysis, a political of-
fense was not, by its nature, a common crime. Although it is possible to
characterize crimes as political by the motivation that underpins them,
such a methodology, in the opinion of the commentator, allowed for
127. Comment attributed to Helmut Schmidt of West Germany.
128. Conseil d'etat, sect. du contentieux, Fr., 106 J. DR. Irr't. 91, 96 (1979).
129. Id at 91-95.
130. Id at 94.
131. I.d at 91-95.
132. Id at 94.
133. Id
134. See Note, David Ruzi6, id at 96.
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the possibility of affixing too easily the label of political upon ordinary
criminal acts. The subjective interpretation of the concept of a political
offense, ie., defining the political character of an act by its purpose,
opened the door to too many abuses. 35
For our part, the decision of the Conseil d'etat has a more restric-
tive, although nonetheless significant, import. Rather than address the
issue of how the courts should go about defining a political crime, le.,
either by reference to its objective political character or by weighing its
common elements against its political aspects to determine which gives
-a predominant coloration to the act, the opinion of the court seems to
focus upon the place of terrorist acts within this on-going debate. The
key doctrinal pronouncement of the court resides in the fact that the
seriousness of such crimes does not permit a court of law to take into
account the possible political motivation of the act; otherwise, the inter-
est in the protection and preservation of society would be jeopardized.
Although the court may have recommended a return at least to the
basic principles of the objective test, what is certain about its decision is
that it places terrorist acts outside the debate concerning relative politi-
cal offenses and outside the scope of the political offense exception be-
cause of the menace they pose to society.
For the court, it seems unquestionable that terrorist activities are
ordinary criminal acts and that, despite the ideological coloration that
their perpetrators attribute to them, they remain common crimes. A
court, in a situation in which an individual opposed to a totalitarian or
otherwise absolutist regime committed ordinary crimes because of his
opposition to the government, e.g., the Astudillo Calleja case, should
retain some discretion to make a choice between the individual's right
to asylum and the state's interest in repressing criminal activity. The
determination in such cases should be made in an ad hoc fashion with
reference to the particular circumstances of the case. It seems, how-
ever, that in a Hennin or Holder case, where the potential extraditee
has committed ordinary crimes in a free and democratic society and the
crimes have as their target innocent victims and as their purpose the
reeking of havoc and confusion among the general population, the ju-
diciary should be little disposed to consider the political coloration of
these acts as an obstacle to extradition. The teaching of the decision of
the Conseil d'etat seems to lie here: where viable channels of free polit-
ical expression exist, there is little justification for wanton violent acts
135. See id at 97-98. For an account of the legal decisions in West Germany concerning
Mr. Croissant, see Le Monde, Nov. 10, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
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regardless of the motivation that inspires them. Regardless of his per-
sonal political opinions, Croissant engaged in criminal activity by aid-
ing criminals to commit their crimes; the interests of Western
democratic societies dictate that this type of act should be punished by
appropriate legal sanctions.
The Riperno case is the latest French decision concerning the ex-
tradition of an alleged transnational terrorist from France. This deci-
sion confirms the view that the holding in Croissant presaged a
significant re-orientation of French jurisprudence in this area. In the
light of doctrines established by these two recent cases, the Cour
d'appel of Paris appears to be abandoning the position that it advanced
in the Holder opinion and to be moving towards elaborating a defini-
tion of a political crime which lessens or perhaps eliminates the possi-
bility that terrorist acts could be included in that category of crimes.
Although the French jurisprudence still can be considered to be in its
formative stages, the Cour d'appel seems to be asserting a much needed
measure of judicial autonomy in these matters by disregarding external
political factors and concentrating upon the legal issue presented. The
French courts today are following the dominant trend among the
courts of the world community and moulding their decisions in the
spirit of the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism. 136
The P7erno case arose as the result of an investigation that is cur-
rently being conducted in France by a team of special anti-terrorist
agents in conjunction with the French police and Interpol. t37 The pur-
pose of the investigation is to apprehend members of the terrorist group
known as the Red Brigades who are believed to be hiding in France
and who are suspected of having participated in the assassination of
Aldo Moro.138 The P&Oerno case involved two extradition requests
made by the Italian Government for one Francesco Piperno, a 37-year-
old physics professor who taught at the University of Cosenza and who
136. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, openedfor rignature, Jan.
27, 1977, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1272 (1976). The Convention was designed to
be a European response to the increase in terrorist activities by providing for a unified and
firm stance on matters relating to the extradition of transnational terrorists. According to
the Convention, extradition is a "particularly effective measure" by which to guarantee that
terrorist offenders will not escape prosecution and punishment. To achieve its ends, the
Convention imposes upon signatory states a duty to prosecute-or-extradite perpetrators of
terrorist acts, although it still gives the signatory states a certain amount of discretion in
making the ultimate determination in these matters. For an assessment of the possible im-
pact of the Convention upon extradition practice, see Carbonneau, supra note 18, at 39-43.
137. RedBrigade Hunt Intensifies in France, Int'l Herald Trib., Sept. 4, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
138. Id
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had taken an active part in radical left-wing politics.' 39 Most notably,
while in Italy, Pipemo had been the leader of the Workers Autonomy
Movement 140 and, more significantly, he had acted as quasi-intermedi-
ary between Italian parliamentary members and terrorists during the
negotiations on the fate of Aldo Moro.' 4 1 On April 7, 1979, when Ital-
ian judicial authorities charged Piperno with insurrection against the
State and with membership in an urban guerrilla group, he went into
hiding.142 On August 18, 1979, he was apprehended in Paris and de-
tained at theprison de la Sant4' on the basis of an arrest warrant issued
on July 7, 1979, by an Italian magistrate. 4 3 After his apprehension, the
Italian Government made a request for Pipemo's extradition based
upon the insurrection and subversive activities charges.Y""
Legal action on the extradition request was delayed several
times.145 The accused made appearances before the chambre des mises
en accusation of the Cour d'appel of Paris on August 21 and 24,146 but
a judicial decision on the merits of the extradition request was post-'
poned on these occasions for reasons which could not be ascertained
from press reports or official documents. During at least one of these
appearances, and once thereafter, Piperno made a request before the
court for political asylum in France. Apparently, the court never gave
serious consideration to these requests which more properly should
have been lodged with government officials in the Ministry of Jus-
tice.' 47 The court finally rendered its decision on August 31, rejecting
the Italian Government's request for Piperno's extradition. 48
The outcome of the decision was not surprising. Its basic rationale
was based upon an elementary rule of extradition law that the three
charges upon which the extradition request had been based viz. in-
volvement with armed subversive groups, armed insurrection against
the state, and hiding criminals, were not among the enumerated of-
fenses contained in the Franco-Italian Extradition Convention of May
12, 1870 and were not, therefore, within the scope of the French Extra-
139. Prisoner in Paris Chargedin Moro Death, Int'l Herald Trib., Sept. 3, 1979, at 6, col,
6.
140. Id
141. Glucksman, Lepantalon de M. Brenev, Le Monde, Sept. 27, 1979, at 14, col. 5.
142. Red Brigade Hunt Intensfies in France, supra note 137.
143. Le Figaro, Aug. 20, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
144. Le Monde, Sept. 2-3, 1979, at 20, col. 2.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id
148. Id; Int'l Herald Trib., Sept. 3, 1979, at 6, col. 6.
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dition Statute of March 10, 1927. Moreover, Italian judicial authorities
apparently had anticipated the result because it appears that the
charges for which extradition had been requested were deliberately
stated in terms which contained no reference to a specific incident in
order not to compromise the on-going investigation in France of the
involvement of Red Brigades terrorists in the Aldo Moro murder. 49
This is apparent because on August 29, a few days before the court was
scheduled to render its decision on the extradition request, the Italian
Government already had made a second request for Piperno's extradi-
tion which contained forty-six specific charges including accusations of
direct involvement in the murder of Aldo Moro on May 9, 1978 and
other terrorist crimes perpetrated in Italy- 50
Judicial action on this second request again was delayed several
times due to the court's desire to take the matter into deliberation. A
final judicial pronouncement was not forthcoming until October 17.1s1
On that date, in a lengthy opinion, the chambre des mises en accusation
of the Cour d'appel rendered a partially favorable judgment on the
question of whether the accused should be extradited, limiting the
grounds upon which extradition could be granted to two of the forty-six
charges contained in the arrest warrant of August 29.112
These two charges related to Piperno's alleged complicity in the
sequestration and murder of Aldo Moro.15 3 The major part of the
court's opinion discussed the defense arguments which had been ad-
vanced in the September 26 hearing. Piperno's lawyers contended that
the August 29 arrest warrant referred to the same charges that were
contained in the July 7 arrest warrant upon which the first extradition
request had been based and refused. According to the defense, since
these charges were essentially the same although they had a different
juridical description, the second extradition request also should be re-
fused.
149. See, eg., Int'l Herald Trib., Sept. 3, 1979, at 6, col. 6.
150. See id; Le Monde, Sept. 2-3, 1979, at 20, coL 2.
151. See Le Figaro, Sept. 20, 1979, at 13, col. 2; id Sept. 27, 1979, at 16, col. 1; Le
Monde, Sept. 28, 1979, at 1, coL 5, at 13, col. 1.
152. Le Figaro, Oct. 18, 1979, at 14, col. 6; Le Matin, Oct. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 6 at 10, coL
1; Le Monde, Oct. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 5, at 14, col. 1.
153. For the following summary of the court's opinion, the author has relied upon the
extensive report contained in Le Monde, Oct. 19, 1979, at 14, coL 1, which was verified by
consulting an official extract of the court decision and a United States Department of State
translation of the former document. These documents were furnished by Professor Richard
B. Lillich of the University of Virginia School of Law to whom the author expresses grati-
tude for his cooperation. All paraphrases and quotations are from the news account; no
other references will be made.
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The court, however, rejected this argument. In its view, the two
warrants were based upon two separate and distinct criminal investiga-
tions by the Italian authorities. The second arrest warrant was the re-
sult of criminal investigation number 1 482-78, which had originated in
1978 and revealed grounds for the common law charges of assassina-
tion, murder, and sequestration. A prior criminal investigation,
number 1 067-79, had been instituted in 1979 by the same Italian inves-
tigative unit concerning the charges relating to insurrection and subver-
sive activities. The court deemed that there was "an absolute
difference" between these two investigations in that they related to "ac-
tivities which [were] . . . far from being identical."
The court observed that the 1979 investigation which led to the
delivery of the first warrant concerned charges which "came into the
realm of political ideals", but that common law crimes such as assassi-
nation, murder or sequestration contained in the August 29 warrant
were not crimes of a political character. Moreover, the investigation
upon which the second warrant was based was still in progress and had
resulted in the discovery of new and important elements which trans-
formed the suspicions against the accused into legal presumptions of
guilt. It is upon these grounds that the court "declared unfounded the
principal defense arguments and rejected them."
The four factual allegations which supported the charges in the
August 29 warrant of Piperno's complicity in the sequestration and
murder of Aldo Moro were: (1) when the Italian police arrested two
Red Brigades terrorists in a Rome apartment on May 30, 1979, in pos-
session of weapons which had been used in the assassination of Aldo
Moro, the owner of the apartment stated that she had taken these two
persons in at Piperno's request; (2) the Metropoli, a magazine for which
Piperno was principal editor, had published drawings of the topogra-
phy of the place where Aldo Moro was being held; (3) the same publi-
cation had revealed the terms of negotiations which the accused had
initiated concerning the fate of Aldo Moro while the latter still was
being held; and, (4) the accused had named the conditions for Aldo
Moro's release, namely, that he would be returned if imprisoned Red
Brigades members were set free. The court stated that, in its considera-
tion of these facts, it looked only to "what concerned the conduct of
Mr. Piperno relative to the holding of Mr. Aldo Moro, to the threats of
death against the latter and to his assassination." The court concluded
that, although the accused had not been the direct "material agent" of
these crimes, he was an accomplice to the sequestration and murder of
Aldo Moro.
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The doctrinally significant, albeit considerably shorter, part of the
court's sixteen-page opinion concerned the would-be political character
of the acts of the accused and of the extradition request. In the first
part of its opinion, the court explicitly characterized the charges for
which extradition could lie as charges of common law crimes. In the
second section of the opinion, the court went on to give the reasons for
that characterization. These reasons centered primarily upon the "seri-
ousness" and "gravity" of the acts involved. In the court's view, neither
the motivation for the acts nor the circumstances in which they were
committed could be regarded as factors that dispel the common or or-
dinary aspect of these criminal acts. The court expressly stated that
"whatever objective may have been sought, or whatever the nature of
the context in which such facts could be integrated, they, in light of
their seriousness, cannot be considered to have a political character."
Despite the brevity of its reasoning, the court took some pains to
emphasize that, in its view, these extremely grave crimes posed a men-
ace to society. Complicity in the moral and physical torture of an inno-
cent person and in his subsequent assassination could, in the court's
estimation, in no way be equated with or justified by the contention
that they were the expression of political beliefs. One would assume,
although the court never stated so explicitly, that the alleged ends pur-
sued were simply too disproportionate with the means employed to
merit consideration as a political crime. Finally, the principle of speci-
ality which limits the grounds upon which the extraditee can be tried to
those for which the extradition request was granted effectively dispelled
any concern about a possible political motivation of the extradition re-
quest itself.
The Cour d'appers holding in _Piperno on the political offense
question constitutes the statement of an invaluable judicial doctrine in
the struggle to bring legal sanctions to bear against transnational ter-
rorists and their accomplices. While the court made no explicit refer-
ence to a formal test in elaborating its holding on the political offense
issue, it appears to be clear that it was deploying a set of criteria similar
to the predominance test of the Swiss courts, namely, weighing the
common aspects of the crime against its political features. Moreover,
the court seems to have established conclusively that, even when the
liberal requirements of a predominance test are applied to a given ex-
tradition case, terrorist acts will fall outside of the scope of the political
offense exception to extradition. This position is in keeping with the
jurisprudence established by the Swiss and other national courts to the
effect that terrorist acts are an inappropriate and unacceptable means
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of political expression; they represent an invidious threat of harm to
innocent populations and civilization and are a disproportionate means
to achieve any alleged political end.
It also should be pointed out that the reasoning of the Cour
d'appel supports the spirit of the 1977 European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism. 154 The Convention is basically an extradi-
tion agreement, assuring countries seeking the extradition of terrorists
who have committed violent acts on their territories and fled to signa-
tory countries either that extradition will be forthcoming when the ter-
rorists are apprehended or, if extradition is not granted, that the
terrorists will be prosecuted in the courts of the requested country. 55
The provisions of Articles 1 and 2 contain a detailed list of paradig-
matic terrorist crimes which are exempted explicitly from the political
offense exception. These crimes include airplane hijacking, attacks on
the life and physical integrity of internationally-protected persons or
other innocent persons, kidnapping, and the use of a bomb or rocket.156
The Convention also excludes from the political offense exception any
"attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an
accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an
offence."' 57 By ruling that the "seriousness" of the charges for which
Piperno could be extradited withdrew any application of the political
offense exception, the Cour d'appel encouraged the courts of other
countries to uphold the basic intention and consensus underlying the
1977 European Convention.
CONCLUSIONS
Terrorist crimes, like all criminal acts, pose a serious menace to
innocent victims and societal interests. The transnational character of
terrorist activities raises yet another obstacle to efforts to bring legal
154. See text accompanying note 135 supra. This Convention was signed by all member
countries of the Council of Europe with the exception of Malta and Ireland. 16 IN'L LvOAL
MAT'LS 233 (1977).
155. Convention, supra note 135, at preamble.
156. Id at art. 1.
157. Id at art I(f). On Nov. 7, 1979, the chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel of
Paris also rendered a favorable decision in a companion extradition case. This case con-
cerned the Italian Government's request for the extradition of Lanfranco Pace, an associate
of Mr. Piperno who also was wanted on charges relating to the sequestration and assassina.
tion of Aldo Moro. The court rendered a favorable opinion regarding the extradition re-
quest on the same grounds that it did in the Pierno case. It thereby reinforced its doctrinal
position in regard to the extradition of transnational terrorists. For an account of the Pace
case, see Le Figaro, Nov. 8, 1979, at 14, col. 5; Le Matin, Nov. 8, 1979, at 14, col. 5; Le
Monde, Nov. 19, 1979, at 17, col. 1.
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sanctions to bear against criminal offenders. The extradition of appre-
hended terrorists, of course, is one legal means by which to respond to
this situation. The apparent consensus among the courts of the world
community is that the political offense exception is not designed and
should not be interpreted or modified to cover such acts. The reason-
ing in Holder and, to a lesser extent, the outcome of the Abu Daoud
case were testimony to the fact that the French court did not subscribe
to the prevailing view that terrorist acts could not be considered legally
as having a political character. The Croissant and the Poperno deci-
sions represent a significant departure from that earlier stance.
Despite the fact that French courts seem to have adopted a pre-
dominance approach to the definition of a political crime, the Cour
d'appel in its two latest extradition decisions has excluded complicity
with terrorist acts from the purview of the political offense exception.
In P#7erno, the court expressly excluded the extraditable offense from
the exemption afforded to political crimes on the ground that the ter-
rorist act in question was too grave and serious in nature to give consid-
eration to its motivation or the circumstances in which it was
committed. This re-orientation-which one hopes will be definitive-is
a welcome change in the French jurisprudence in this area and should
serve as an example to other jurisdictions of the need to bring legal
sanctions to bear against terrorist offenders.
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